What Ukraine — or Russia — must do to win

Jamie Detmer is Opinion Editor at POLITICO Europe.

“We have to learn and learn,” Russian Political Commissar Pavel Kalitov admitted in his journal in September 1942. “For starters, we should stop being so reckless.”

His words foreshadow the complaints of pro-war Russian critics today, fervent in the face of the inefficiency that opened up billet Russian consignments to a devastating Ukrainian missile strike in Makiivka on New Year’s Day.

Like this battle, the Red Army had a bad start to World War II. Its weaknesses were brutally exposed by the battle-tested Germans, as its officer corps was still recovering from Stalin’s purges and in June 1941 Adolf Hitler and his generals – confident of a quick victory – sought to rebuild themselves. were in the initial stages of. In fact, the German high command was so confident that it didn’t even plan to supply winter clothing for its troops – just as the Russian generals were so confident of a swift victory the previous year, they asked subordinates to march to Kyiv. Urged to pack for the Victory Parade.

However, by the end of the war, the Red Army had indeed learned. And the question is, can Russia’s armed forces do the same today under the overall command of General Sergei Surovikin? The answer may well determine the outcome of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine.

“Wars measured in years become contests in organizational learning and adaptation; Ultimately it is the difference between victory and defeat,” says military academic Michael Clarke. And as Putin’s war approaches its first anniversary, both sides are now taking stock and planning their next steps in the conflict. Which is stuck in the holding pattern for the last three months.

The land war is now focused on a 600-km-long front line in Ukraine’s Donbas region. It has become a meat grinder of a conflict, and fierce close fighting has seen with high casualties Let down by both sides. Ukraine appears to have the upper hand in Luhansk, but around Soledar in the Donetsk region, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s “punishment battalions” have made inroads, prompting Ukrainian forces to deploy reinforcements over the past few days as Russia completes the takeover. Motivated to try to stop doing. Salt-mining town, Western military officials say.

Clearly, both sides are eyeing a breakout and decisive spring campaign.

Kirill Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, told ABC News Last week that Ukraine was planning a major offensive in the spring and that it expected fighting to be “the hottest” in March. “it is [when we will see more] Liberation of the regions and dealing with the final defeat of the Russian Federation,” he said. And he implied that Ukraine is planning “deeper and deeper” disinformation attacks with drones and missiles. In Russia

Ukrainian officials too Believe Russia is stockpiling weapons and equipment for its own offensives in the south and east of Ukraine, and they claim the Kremlin will soon announce another partial mobilization, this time of 500,000, to add to the 300,000 already called for. . Putin has denied it is imminent, but he said the same a few days before last year’s partial mobilization.

However, pro-war Russian military bloggers say a further mobilization will be necessary to mount breakouts around Donetsk and Kharkiv. And former Russian intelligence officer and paramilitary commander Igor Girkin, who played a key role in the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass, predicted that another call-up would be announced to coincide with the war’s first anniversary: ​​”The second There will be a wave of mobilization. We will be forced to execute a second and perhaps a third wave. To win in Ukraine, we will need to call in at least half a million troops,” he wrote in a telegram.

Still, military experts doubt the sheer numbers would be enough to overwhelm Ukrainian forces – although significantly more troops on the ground would indeed have an effect. Instead, the real challenge for Russia will be to overcome poor logistics and adapt and professionalize to fight 21st-century warfare, which requires integrated infantry, armour, artillery and air support to achieve mutually complementary effects. will be required.

Since 2014 thanks to Western training and aid from Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet network, Ukraine has proven adept at this type of combined arms warfare – sometimes referred to as fourth-generation warfare. But Russia didn’t and it faltered.

A Ukrainian tank sits along a road in the city of Kupiansk that has experienced regular shelling from the Russians on January 06, 2023. Spencer Platt/Getty Images

This has also been the case with small-unit tactics, where Russia has consistently been outperformed by better-trained Ukrainian forces, capable leadership by noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with decision-making authority on a fast-moving battlefield. can rely on. The Russian military has long admitted it has a problem with poorly trained NCOs, starting an academy several years ago after it realized there was a lack of good leadership at lower levels. However, little progress had been made prior to last year’s invasion.

Thus, for Russia to win on the battlefield, everything—from dramatically improving its combined-arms warfare to rebuilding its NCO cadre—must be fixed. That’s a tall order in the midst of war, and would take months of training.

To conquer Ukraine, however, it comes down to supplying the equipment needed to bolster its offensive capabilities, hence the months-long pleas from Kyiv to its Western allies for 300 so-called third-generation main battle tanks. are made for. The battlefield of the digital age – in other words, America’s M1A2 Abrams, France’s Leclerc, Britain’s Challenger 2 and Germany’s Leopard, as well as nearly 600 combat vehicles.

What are you saying? … Offered So far Instead – 50 Bradley and 40 Marder combat vehicles by the US and Germany, respectively, and about 30 light AMX-10 RC armored vehicles by France – the armored punch is far short of the calculation of its needs in Kyiv’s pursuit of victory. But Ukrainians hope it is a sign that they will be able to provide more of what allies need.

Last week, President Volodymyr Zelensky, Told: “There is no rational reason why Western-type tanks have not yet been supplied to Ukraine.” But while that may be so from their perspective, it is not the case for Ukraine’s hesitant allies, who see two concerns: that transferring such large amounts of armor would deplete their own arsenals – and that it Will do at least this. A time of heightened tension in both Europe and Asia.

Here, Britain is in a tight spot compared to most other major military powers, with only 227 Challenger 2 tanks – 148 of which are being upgraded or scheduled for refurbishment to extend their operational lives until 2035. has gone. The remaining 79 are needed as a stopgap and at will. Then retire.

Meanwhile, there are 2,000 Leopard tanks in active service distributed among Germany, 13 other European countries, and some non-EU countries, including Canada. And no country has more than 100 in service – except Germany, which has 266.

for a spring offensive. And Ukrainian officials are rebuffed by arguments that arsenals are being depleted, pointing out that their allies do not face an immediate existential threat, their emergency. Now – The country will emphasize this at the next meeting of the “Rammstein” Contact Group of Western Defense Ministers, to be held on January 20.

However, 3,600 Leopard 2 tanks were built, and hundreds of older models that have been mothballed and stored across Europe could potentially be reused in time for the spring offensive. And Ukrainian officials are rebuffed by arguments that arsenals are being depleted, pointing out that their allies do not face an immediate existential threat, their emergency. Now – The country will emphasize this at the next meeting of the “Rammstein” Contact Group of Western Defense Ministers, to be held on January 20.

At the meeting, Ukraine will also face its allies’ second objection when it comes to the tanks – fear of escalation and the risk of Russian retaliation that could bring. Kyiv has been facing arguments from more nervous Western European allies since the start of the war – though not from its immediate neighbors, who are more likely to face the consequences of Russian retaliation and believe this is not the time to give back at school. Hai- yard bully.

So, while Russia largely holds the destiny of its battlefield in its own hands, the fate of Ukraine ultimately rests in the fate of its allies.