Published: Publish Date – 12:45 AM, Tue – 30 Aug 22
by Nayaka Veeresh
On 2 August 2022, a two-judge bench of Supreme court pronounced its verdict in the case of Satyajit Kumar & Ors vs State of Jharkhand & Ors (2022), The bench said that 100% reservation to local tribals is in violation of Articles 14 and 16 (4) of the Constitution, besides Articles 13 (2), 15, 16 (3) and 35 (AI).
Earlier in the same case, Jharkhand High Court had relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in September 2020 in which case? Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao Vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2020) To invalidate 100% reservation for local tribals. The main issue dealt with in both these cases is the constitutional validity of 100% reservation provided to Scheduled Tribe candidates (STs) for the post of teachers in schools in Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.
The decision opens the floodgates for states in the Fifth Schedule to revisit the socio-economic initiatives aimed at uplifting tribals from marginalized areas in all walks of life.
In the case of Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao Vs State Andra Pradesh (2020), the Supreme Court observed that “providing 100 per cent reservation is not permissible and is violative of Articles 14 and 16(4) of the Constitution of India”.
procedural vs substantive analogy
In both these judgments, the Supreme Court has stayed only to deny the benefits of genuine equality and distributive justice over formal or procedural equality. The court’s finding that the Governor’s order providing 100% reservation in certain employment opportunities to local tribals is violative of Articles 14 and 16, is illogical, as the argument of this claim is made only through the prism of the formal. has gone. Equality. The founders of the Constitution envisaged the attainment of real equality through formal equality only as an enablement, but not as a special condition.
The achievement of true equality requires state action as part of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution. Thus, the Fundamental Rights in Part III remain only on paper unless there is a conscious effort of the State to enforce them. Any discussion with respect to the fundamental rights of citizens and the rights of marginalized sections of the society in general must include the role of the state in terms of Article 46.
The apex court erred in both the judgments by treating Part III of the Constitution as standalone, reducing the role of the state and subsequently undermining the importance of the Fifth Schedule and the vision of social justice.
seen in Mohini Jain (Miss) vs State of Karnataka,
“The Fundamental Directive Principles in the Governance of the Country cannot be separated from the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III. These principles should be read in Fundamental Rights. The two complement each other. in which the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons under Part III may be enjoyed by all”.
Upholding Articles 14 and 16 as the sole principles of equality, the court has deprived the tribals of their rights so as to increase the possibility of historical discrimination of tribals at the hands of non-tribal communities. In simple words, both the decisions have done justice to the non-tribal communities at the cost of tribal rights in the Fifth Schedule.
The rule of law or law (here the principle of equality) is one of the means of delivering justice; If a law fails to provide justice to the minority population in a democracy, it is bound to widen the gap between the majority and minority population. in the decision of the Supreme Court S Nagaraj and others v. State of Karnataka (1993) It has ensured that:
“Justice is a virtue that transcends all obstacles. Neither the rules of procedure nor the technicality of law can come in its way. The order of the Court should not be adversarial to anyone. To gaze for stability Rule is obeyed but it is not as flexible in administrative law as in public law. Even the law bows before justice.”
irregular classification
In the present cases, the Supreme Court and judges have only been successful in applying rules of procedure or technical (ceremonial equality) of law to deny justice to tribal communities in the field of education. Therefore, the judgments are judicial for the non-tribals and in this case adverse for the tribals. In both cases, justice has been submerged in a sea of laws rather than being upheld in the midst of certain legal provisions, especially not in exceptional circumstances or conditions.
In several paragraphs, the judgment is mentioned tribals Just to highlight the imposed binary classification of “we” and “they” as “they” which is factually incorrect and legally untenable in the context of the Constitution. Such an impressive and precarious classification or even description by the Supreme Judiciary is unacceptable as the classification has the potential to marginalize tribals or other backward classes of people in the society at large.
The apex court has been successful in reaching procedural equality in the matter of legality as a whole and it is also considered as a form of political equality. The crux of the controversy is that the special provisions of the Constitution, especially reservation for SCs/STs in the field of education and employment, are meant to achieve social, economic and cultural equality apart from legal or political equality. The court appears to have missed these socio-economic and cultural dimensions in general and the suffering and humiliation of the tribals, in particular, in pre- and post-colonial times.
A contrasting understanding of the Fifth Schedule contrasts the constitutional vision of social justice and civilizational values with viewing and understanding tribal culture only through the binary lens of “they” (tribals) and “us or us” (mainstream). The principle of equality is a necessary condition, yet it is insufficient to achieve the ultimate goal of social justice. In both the judgments, the court has completely backtracked in advancing social justice for the tribals, by depriving the non-tribals of equal opportunities or disposing of the case on the basis of the principle of exclusion.
(The author is PhD Fellow, Center for Political Institutions, Governance and Development of the Institute for Social and Economic Change [ISEC], Bangalore. views are personal)