Military Digest: Declassified CIA files reveal intelligence assessment of Generals Cariappa, Sundarji

Foreign intelligence agencies have always been interested in the activities of the Indian military’s top officials. These agencies often gather information by talking to officers of the country during seemingly harmless conversations. As a result, intelligence agencies regularly create personality profiles based on the information collected by defence attaches.

Some declassified files in the archives of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provide interesting insight into how the CIA perceived the Indian military brass over the years and analysed its actions.

The comments on two important figures in the Indian Army’s history, Field Marshal K M Cariappa and General K Sundarji, are especially of interest given the role the two played in transforming the Army. While Cariappa had the vital task of giving a national character to the Army post-Independence, which he set forward to do with the raising of The Brigade of The Guards, Sundarji’s moves to transform and modernise the Indian Army gave him an important place in the annals of modern Indian military history.

In reading and assimilating the CIA assessment of these two key figures, we must remember that they were written with a US perspective and understanding of the situation. While they will certainly not align with the Indian appreciation of the same issues, they give vital insight into the hows and whys of the US assessment methods.

The comments on General (later Field Marshal) K M Cariappa

Festive offer

In a CIA document headlined ‘India’s new C-in-C’ from 1948-49, it is said that the impending departure of General Sir Roy Bucher, the British officer then commanding the Indian Army, increases the possibility of open warfare between India and Pakistan. General Bucher, who is to relinquish the office of Commander-in-Chief on 15 January, has exerted a moderating influence on Indian military policy and, with the cooperation of his British opposite number in Pakistan, has kept to a minimum direct encounters between the Indian Army and Pakistan’s regular troops in Kashmir,“ the document says.

It goes on to say, “His successor Lt Gen KM Cariappa gives the impression of being vain temperamentally unstable and lacking in sound military judgement; there is a danger that in attempting to give palatable military advice to the Indian government he may fail to give due consideration to all of the military and political factors involved and that he may use his new position to seek personal glory that a speedy termination of the Kashmir campaign would provide.”

In another document related to discussions between General Cariappa and the then Burmese military brass, the CIA reported that the Indian Commander-in-Chief had promised Indian Army aid in case of Chinese communist invasion despite any opposition from Indian politicians. The CIA analysed that it was doubtful that the Government of India would permit the dispatch of Indian troops to Burma in the event of a Chinese invasion despite Cariappa’s assurances.

A declassified CIA document dated June 1950 is titled ‘Rift in the officer corps of the Indian Army’ and mentions an assassination attempt on General Cariappa during his inspection tour of East Punjab.

The document alleges that six persons had been sentenced to death in connection with the plot and that “several high Army officers are believed involved”.

CIA analyses of General Sundarji’s letter to all officers

In February 1986, soon after taking over as Chief of Army Staff, General Sundarji wrote a four-page letter addressed to all Army officers highlighting his key focus areas and the need for the officer corps to reinvent itself and rededicate itself to the corps concept of soldiering.

Quite predictably, the CIA reached conclusions of its own, which differed with the intentions of the Chief.

“A recent open letter from the Chief of Army Staff to all Indian Army officers suggests that military professionalism has declined to unacceptable levels.

The Chief of Army Staff’s admonitions against careerism, opportunism, and sycophancy probably reflect Rajiv Gandhi’s priorities as Defense Minister and a belated recognition by senior military officers that India’s economic and social problems are having a detrimental impact on the Army. The Chief’s letter fails to mention an emerging pattern of violence perpetrated by Indian Army personnel that further calls into question the image and role of the Army as an apolitical and professional institution,” the CIA assessment reads.

The analysis stated that General Sundarji is using this issue to achieve bureaucratic and personal objectives. It opined that by bringing the Prime Minister’s anticorruption drive into the Army, Sundarji might hope to curry favour with Gandhi and gain Rajiv’s support on other military issues, such as the creation of an Army aviation corps.

“He may also be angling for a high government job after he retires in 1988,” it said. It may be noted that Sundarji got no high office after retirement, contrary to the CIA assessment of his motives.

Assessing his rise in the Army over the years, the CIA wrote that Sundarji served as Vice Army Chief of Staff before assuming his present duties this year and that in his most recent capacities, he has approved and helped engineer the meteoric rise of a senior Army officer whose wife was allegedly related to the Gandhi family.

Noting that Sundarji’s letter was “less than full disclosure,” the report said that a notable omission from Sundarji’s otherwise candid assessment is the growing incidents of violence perpetrated by Army enlisted men and officers and the development of a “we-they” attitude in instances where the Army has been called in to maintain civil order—over 400 times since 1980.

“Last year, for example, four Army officers, including a battalion commander, faced charges of looting in Amritsar following the 1984 raid in the Golden Temple…….”. It went on to give some more examples from other parts of the country.

The document concluded by saying that this unwillingness to address this problem in his letter “demonstrates the limits that even India’s “most professional officer” respects in challenging the Army’s image as a professional force helping to maintain India’s democratic system”. Further comments have been redacted in the analysis.